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Introduction
 
I arrived in Seoul, South Korea, June 2 and left June 19, a total 
of 18 days; only 12 of these could be termed actual working days 
(i.e. 	 not weekends or days of arrival and departure). 
In that rather brief time I had meetings withA some 39 Korean 
and 	American or luropean specialists and officials (an average of
 
about 3.3 working days), located and investigated the operation and
 
interests of half a dozen research centers or institutes, visited the
 
satellite city of Kwang Ju, roamed through a squatter settlement in 
Seoul, spent one day at the provincial city of Taegu, briefed senior
 
officials of AID concerning my findings, and was myself briefed by
 
the planning staff of the City of Seoul. I typed out myself about
 
50 pages of single-spaced notes and returned home with a small
 
library of books, reports, monographs, and pamphlets, in addition to
 
a well-used English-Korean dictionary and phrase book.
 
Throughout the trip I made a determined effort to meet and mix
 
with Koreans at various social levels; to explore on foot different
 
sections of Seoul, Kwang Ju, and Taegu; to learn as much as possible
 
about urban living patterns and of Korean cultural patterns generally;
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and to eat Korean food whenever possible where Koreans thamselves were
 
eating. Thus, what I was told about Korea and Seoul by others I could
 
match with my own subjective impressions and personal experiences.
 
Never before have I learned so much from so many in such a short space 
of time. 
Although the visit was brief, my contacts and experiences we:-e 
wide-ranging. I never quite lost the sense of "cultural shock" which 
is an essential requirement for knowledge acquisition in a new
 
environment. But inasmuch as my sources were varied, and data were 
acquired on the run, some cetails of this report may be inaccurate.
 
However, T believe the general conclusions are sound. I trust it 
will be useful for the Smithsonian Institutiorn and for the Government
 
of South Korea eventually. It is my understanding that this report 
in its present form will not be released to anyone other than
 
Dr. Wallen and other involved officials at the Smithsonian Institution.
 
This report will not be complete without a personal note about
 
the unusual difficulties encountered. My assignment, as outlined by
 
Dr. Wallen, was to look at the City of Seoul's plans to build
 
satellite cities as a means of relieving population pressure on the
 
capital itself. I was not to evaluate those plans but only to
 
consider them from a sociological perspective, and hopefully, come
 
up with questions, insights, suggestions stemming from my own special
 
qualifications as both a sociologist and student of Asian urbanization.
 
So, I had to find out (I) what those plans actually were, (2) how the
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plans had been implemented in the first satellite city known as
 
Kwang Ju, (3) how much study sociologists and research institutes
 
it,the Seoul area had done already, and what their own conclusions 
were.
 
The scholars and research centers presented no problem. But
 
the assignment turned out to be a "Mission Impossible',' thanks to the
 
initially cool official climate in Seoul. Remember that I ca,1e to
 
Korea as a kind of representajive of the Smithsonian--and as a 
sociologist. Both connections were anathema, something I learned 
almost at once in my first and unusually tense mceting with the 
Vice Mayor of Seoul. It took me a full week to put all the pieces
 
of the puzzle together and find an explanation for the hostile
 
environment:
 
First, my connection with the Smithsonian. Previously visitors 
from the Smithsonian who had been taken to see the Kwang Ju project 
had described it publicly as an outright "horror." There had been 
already, I discovered, some scorching criticisms of the Kwang Ju 
scheme. Officials were jumpy, inclined to overreact to even an 
informal criticism of a project they were responsible for. This 
frank but inadvertently colorful criticism about Kwang Ju helped put
 
the Smithsonian on some kind of subversive list so far as these
 
officials were concerned. As the very next representative from the
 
Smithsonian coming with the stated intention of taking a long, hard
 
look at Kwang Ju, naturally my reception was less than warm.
 
Secondly, my status as a sociologist. It happened that the UN
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Advisory Group in Seoul had brought in a French sociologist earlier in
 
the year, before the elections, to make a study of rural-urban
 
migration. lie had paid particular attention to the original squatter
 
settlers in the Kwang Ju project wlhn that place was little more than 
a squalid mud hol-. Ihcir ouLrage and misery he described with 
professional exactitude. His report was submitted to 
the UN Group in
 
Seoul, duplicated, and then distributed as a preliminary report to
 
interested persons and to the President's office. When the latter
 
saw the report and realized its explosive political potential on the 
eve of national elections, that office slapped a "top secret" label 
on the report and asked the UN urgently to recall all copies already 
handed out. No one will even discuss the report now, so sensitive 
has it become. As the ery next sociologist from abroad coming with 
the stated intention to study Kwang Ju, naturally the reception was 
less than warm. 
Moreover, I learned eventually (actually on my very last working
 
day) that the present Mayor of Seoul was brought into office in part 
to clean up the mess of Kwang Ju. Ile moved with dispatch and
 
ingenuity, and within a matter of six months had turned the situation
 
around. Both he and his Vice Mayor take pride in their accomplishments
 
(as I believe they should). But once able to finally see a lighu at
 
the end of the famous tunnel, the Mayor and hic assistant were not
 
about to welcome with open arms a potential subversive who might
 
suddenly raise a storm all over again.
 
It should be noted that the Mayor and indeed all local government
 
5
 
officials in South Korea are appointed by the President. They
 
answer to him. Their jobs are demanding, in large part perhaps
 
because the President is demnnding of his officials. They want
 
to do well, naturally, but they also seek to avoid unflattering
 
publicity reflecting on their own abilities and the image of their
 
nation. 
At times they feel the heat and learn next time to be 
more careful. People in Seoul remember with unusual vividness a 
statement made by a reccnt American visitor of some stature that
 
Seoul was the most polluted city in the world. That unflattering 
statement was printed first in an influential American newspaper 
and then reprinted in the international edition of Time magazine 
for all the world to read. Koreans are inordinately sensitive to
 
the public appearance and reputation of their country. Any
 
criticism publicly broadcast is resented, whether about the air
 
of Seoul or the "luality of squatter life in Kwang Ju.
 
The fact that I completed the assignment and even wrote this
 
report should be proof that the finest tradition of a "Mission
 
Impossible" has been satisfied. Actually, I left the Mayor of
 
Seoul smiling, and the handshake from the Vice Mayor on leaving
 
was noticeabLy more friendly than when I first met him one day
 
after my arrival in Seoul.
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PART I: Urbanization and Plannin 
A. TLE PROBLEM. 
Thc central environmental problem of South Korea concerns 
population, more specifically its growth and distribution. The 
1970 census showed a total population of 31.5 million, an increase 
of 2.3 million since. 1966 and an average annual. growth rate of 
approximately 2 percent. If this rate is maintained, then 
South Kcrca's population will double in 35 years, a grim prospect 
for a dove lopin- nation already having the world's third highest 
population density. An active and successful family planning 
program may effect a further decline in the still-high birth rate 
(32 in 1966) but in any event the respite will be temporary. In 
7 years South Korea will face another demographic crisis when the 
proportion of women aged 19-24 will begin a sharp increase, 
precipitating possibly another surge in the birth rate. (Major 
Policies and Prograituies of the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs, 1971; Korea/Taiwan 1970: Report on National Family 
Planning Programs). 
As the postwar population grew, its base has shifted from 
villages to cities at an accelerating pace. In 1960 fully
 
two thirds of South Korea's population lived in rural areas but
 
only 10 years later half the population was deemed to be urban.
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More than any other city, Seoul hais felt the full impact of this
 
rural-urban migration, virtually doubling its population every
 
decade since 1950, as the following tabulation indicates: 
1949 1,418,000
 
1960 2,44S,000
 
1963 3,254,000
 
1965 3,470,000
 
1970 5,509,000
 
(Source: Outline of Seoul City Plan, Bureau of City Planning,
 
Seoul Metropolitan Government.)
 
Seoul now (1971) is one of the world's largest cities with 
a population of 6 million. It already contains by itself 50 percent 
of the total urban population and fully 18 percent of che nation's
 
population. The capital is growing at a rate of 10 percent yearly, 
five times higher than the rate at which the nation's population 
itself is growing. If this present growth rate prevails, then by 
1980 Seoul can expect a population of 12 million. Thus population 
planning in South Korea must be concerned with not simply slowing 
the nation's overall population growth rate but even more urgently 
braking the pace of urbanization so far as Seoul is concerned and 
dispersing the capital's population.
 
8
 
B. THE PLAN.
 
As the figures above show, Seoul has added almost 3 million
 
persons to its population since .963, vet the area of the city
 
has remained unchanged (51.3.04 sq km.). The consequence has been 
intensified crowding--as one obse rver i Letd, Seoul is now wall to 
wall with people. When existing housiig proved insufficient, 
shanty to-ni squatter settlements erupted in and around the city. 
Although Seoul was faced with a host of urban problems as a result 
of this unprecedented gro..,th, by all. accounts that I heard it was 
the proliferation of these highly visible and embarrassing ugly
 
settlements not far from the center of the capital that drove the
 
governmcnt in th later 1 60's to devise a crash program of urban
 
plaMLing for Seoul. 
The Seoul City Plan described to me by the planning staff of
 
the Seoul City Government is a comprehensive planning guide spanning 
a ten-year period, 1970-80, and is concerned with land utilization,
 
population distribution, urban renewal and development, road and
 
subway construction, housing, water supply, sewage and sanitation,
 
air and water pollution control, tourism, health, medical, and
 
social welfare services.
 
The Plan contains these main features that concern population
 
and urbanization:
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1. The anticipated slowing of Seoiil's expansion 
so that by 1981 the capital will have a population of
 
7,500,0,00,only 2 million more Lhan the 1970 population 
and representing an annual avorage growth rate of only 
2.6 percent. Moreover, as the figures below indicate, 
this total will change but very little in the decade 
1981-91. Indeed, the capital's population is expected 
to decline slightly after 198G: 
1976 6,700,000
 
1981 7,500,000
 
1986 7,650,000
 
1991 7,600,000
 
(Source: Outline of Seoul City Plan, Bureau of City Planning,
 
Seoul Metropolitan Government; The Metropolis of 
Seoul in 1980, Seoul Metropolitan Government, 1971) 
2. Redistribution of the population within the present
 
area of Seoul, specifically, (a) reducing the population
 
density of the downtown area by making this even more 
than now ar almost exclusively Central Business District
 
of high-rise buildings; (b) stimulating the development
 
of internediate self-sufficeit subcenters, some 10 km.
 
from the downtown zone, containing apartment houses,
 
businesses, open-air markets, clean industries, and schools
 
designed to relieve demands on the downtown area and thus
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reduce the pressure on transportation facilities; and
 
(c) developing suburban residential communities of 
single-family houses abouL 15 km. from the city center. 
The net antici.pated effect will be to put tht bulk of 
Seoul's population frc:m 10 to 15 kin. from the city 
center, whereas now it is settled from 5 to 10 km. 
from th, center.
 
3. Construction and settlement of a series of
 
"satellite cities" approximately 25 km. from Seoul 
center, 5 to 10 in all and each to have an anticipated 
population by 1980 of about 350,000. These new, cities, 
to be built from scratch in areas that are now entirely 
rural., are meant to bear the brunt of the anticipated 
urban population increase that otherwise will be 
directed at Seoul itself. The first of these satellite
 
cities, Kwang Ju, is already being settled. It will be
 
treated in detail below.
 
The Plan is impressive in its scope. Obviously, it goes well
 
beyond the squatter problem and, as any really good plan should,
 
treats the city as a unit, involving all social levels and
 
neighborhoods. Yet in my opinion the Plan may be. terribly 
flawed. It seems modeled on Western, mostly American, notions of
 
"what the city of the future will be like," and I am afraid that
 
the metropolis the planners haein mind, in terms now of land use,
 
street layout, high-rise architecture, will lack any distinctive 
Korean or even humanizing character (like the high-rise buildings 
themselves). Because of this I frankly find the visual 
representaLioil of the future Seoul appallingly sterile 
(see the Metropolis of Seoul in 1980), and I suspect its citizens 
of the future will also. This subject I shall return to later. 
C. EVAIT, ATION. 
South Korea's urbanization situation is almost identical, to
 
that being experienced in other developing nations of Asia and 
indeed of the world (see Breese, 1966 and 1969). Basically, in 
Seoul an industrial urban complex is being grafted onto a
 
traditional, at times incompatible, preindustrial base 
(see 
Sjoberg, 1960). Moreover, Seoul can be termed the primate city 
of South Korea, and like suc cities elsewhere in Asia (see 
Ginsberg, 1955) exerts a pull on rural migrants far out of
 
proportion to its 
present ability to absorb population. Just as
 
any ambitious Thai wants to go to Bangkok, so Koreans flow into 
Seoul because it is the center of everything. One Korean friend
 
quoted to me a Korean saying, "If you have a son, send him to
 
Seoul, and if you have a horse, send it to Cheju island" (each to
 
the place where he will prosper). At the present time about
 
70 percent of all university students are in Seoul, and these
 
schools are the best. One's life chances in South Korea depend
 
heavily on schooling, and, as in Japan (see Vogel, 1968) the
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particular school one attends will pretty much deteriine one's 
career subsequently. For the well-born, therefore, as for the 
ambitious or simply the footloose and economically marginal 
peasant or laborer, there is no place in South Korea like Seoul. 
Consequently, populaLion and urbanization processes and problems
 
all converge in Seoul.
 
In its basic problem:, of uncontrolled urban growth of the 
primate city South Korea is like many other nations of Asia 
(notably Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Pakistan), 
but it seems to me that this nation is uniquely favored in having: 
(1) an ethnically homogenous population, so that Korean cities like 
Seoul do not become segmented and fractured by culturally. dissimilar 
conunities (the Americans concentrated no,: at South Post are the 
only distinct minority and they exceed even the Chinese of
 
Southeast Asia in their determinned exclusiveness, but so far this 
situation is not defined by the South Koreans as a problem);
 
(2) a long-range plan unusually comprehensive in scope to deal
 
with this problem; (3) the intention, already manifested in the
 
very imaginative construction of Kwang Ju as a satellite city, to
 
implement this plan; and (4) town planning and social science talent
 
in the government and at its universities of a very high order. I
 
found young Korean scholars and administrators truly impressive in
 
terms of their training (usually advanced degrees were from the best
 
American schools and departments) and their empirical research
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competence and activities--all in all, they struck me as probably 
among the best in Asia, if not the very best. But--and this is 
the danger that I seo-.-they arc almost to a man strongly Western­
oricnted aud hwoderpist in out look and given the chance would 
probably produce an American-style city. I believe there are more
 
desirable a].ternatiwvs.
 
PART II: The Satell!t- (.itv as Plonned Comlmni.t-y 
A. KOREAN CONCITONS OF TON PLANNING. 
There is no universally acc:pLa de inition of "town planning," 
and the Korean concept ion, which differs markedly from the American, 
must be understood in order to appreciate the eevelopmenL of the 
satellite cities around Seoul. 
To begin with, the model for planning procedures seems to be 
Japan rather than the United Statcs. Simply put, Koreans plan their 
towns differently from the way we do. As exemplified by procedures 
being followed in Kwang Ju, the first satellite city now under 
construction, town planning mean; engineering: an almost exclusive 
concern with a few basic technical and physical needs of the new 
cormnunity, such as roads, water supply, and sewage disposal. It 
does not seem concerned, at least at this stage of planning in Korea, 
with aesthetic and social considerations. Thus, with regard to
 
Kwang Ju, once the land had been acquired and surveyed and a basic
 
land use plan devised, the government paved only the main entry road,
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brought in water, and made minimum provisions for sewage disposal. 
With this done the area was opened to settlement. After the first 
wave of settlers had begun to build permanent houses, but only then, 
the governie,nt paved other roads, laid out some sidewalks, ai!d made 
final. improvements in the sewage system. In other words, the 
government as planner sketched in the rough outlines of the 
community and the settlers filled in the details. 
This is probably a cheap and efficient way to proceed. ThL 
settlers do much of the work and on the other hand construction 
jobs are generated as the conmunity becomes settled. But the new 
community remains in a rough stage of building for some time, 
and during this year or two has a decidely raw look: dusty dirt 
roads, temporary construction (some families living in tents) 
open drainage ditches, and the like. As the Mayor of Seoul 
jokingly said, "Kwang Ju looks like Texas" -- or the movie version 
of the American frontier cowtown.
 
While such a community is "planned," it is by no stretch of 
the imagination a "model" conmunity in the sense that Reston or 
Columbia are. Because this fact has not been understood some
 
Korean and American visitors to Kwang Ju have been openly critical
 
of the government's efforts, but I think they have expected more
 
out of town planning than the government ever intended.
 
Finally, because for the most part people build their own
 
houses on plots of land no larger than normally available in
 
existing cities, the new planned community is architecturally and
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otherwise pretty much a copy of existing Korean cities like 
Seoul or Taegu. Like Seoul, for example, Kwang Ju has some 
narrow lanes (a few too narrow for fire equipiant , just like 
some lanes in Seoul), high d21nsity of population (congested to 
the American eye), few playgrounds or green areas, an absence of
 
sidewalks, and so on. 
 This also comcs as a shock for visiturs 
who have been led to expect a "miodel" city along WesLern lines. 
But even they will admit that a community like Kwang Ju is better 
planu-d than the older cities; for one thing, noxious industries
 
are isolated from residential areas.
 
I believe that the town planning procedures outlined above
 
and their end product in a community .ikc Kwang Ju are defensible.
 
As noted above, putting some responsibility on the settlers involves
 
them in a developing commnulity which in turn probably produces
 
among them a sense of cormnunity and neighborhood cohesion. A 
community built gradually in this way genaerates construction jobs
 
for settlers; for the first few years, therefore, there Ls no absolute
 
dependence for .,ork on the new industries being located in Kwang Ju.
 
I was told that the construction jobs now available in Kwang Ju were
 
stimulating settlement by new families to a far greater extent 
than
 
the factories being built there.
 
But most important of all the advantages of the town planning
 
procedures exemplified in Kwang Ju is the fact that they result in
 
a Korean community, built by and for rank-and-file Koreans in a
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style they appreciate and desire. For them, by every indication, 
it is a good place in which to live because it conforms to their
 
ideas of what a comiiiiuity should be like. I would contrast Kwang Ju 
(somewhat unfairly pcerhajs) with a planned city like Chandigarh in 
India almost completely designed by the famous French architect and 
planner Corbusier. Chandigarh e-:cited the architectural world, but 
it has proven to be a very uncoifort-able place for Indians to live 
simply becaur:e its design is incompatible with Indian cultural and 
social patturns. This is not the case in Kiang Ju.
 
B. KWANG JU.
 
The foregoing conments might imply that Kwang Ju has been
 
entirely a success. Actually, it can be described as both a
 
failure and a success. But before evaluating the project it would
 
be useful to sumavize its salient features and history. 
Kwang Ju Estatcs kpopularly known, however, as K.ang Ju but 
not to be confused with the old provincial city of the same name 
in the southern part of Korea) is located about 28 km.by road 
southeast of Seoul in a ruralarca of rolling hills, low mountains, 
and a few farm villages. The road to Kwang Ju from Seoul leads 
across the Han River by a narrow older bridge (said to be the 
only one left standing during the Korean War) and then through a 
very congested coimmercial and industrial subcenter of Seoul. Once 
beyond this the road becomes two-laned and suddenly bordered on each 
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side by rice paddies. When I made the trip in early June 
farmers with oxen were plowing flooded fields. Now and then 
the road led past a cluster of grass-roofed farm houses. Even 
by private car 
it is not an easy drive. The road is narrow,
 
often rough, and heavily used by busses and large trucks. It
 
took us by car about 1 hour from Seoul, but by bus I was told
 
it takes about 2 hours.
 
The total area covers 11,550,000 square meters. Of this
 
total, 9,900,000 (85.7 percent) is to developed and the
be rest
 
left as natural. green area. 
 The land was bought by the government 
and the first settlers moved out there in 1969. By the end of 
1972 the cormunity will be completed so far as planned government 
construction is concerned. There ar~e now said to be upwards of 
100,000 persons permanenti.y settled in Kwang Ju but the area is 
so ext:onsi.ve that one does not have the impression of a crowded 
place. When development is completed at the end of 1973 Kuang Ju 
is expected to have a population of 350,000 persons.
 
Kwang Ju is generally flat, or at best gently sloping, but
 
there are some high points that give a view of the entire
 
community. Mountains of no great height are all around and their
 
green, brush-covered slopes contrast with the brown, barren
 
appearance of the project. 
The entire Kwang Ju area destined for
 
development has been bulldozed clean of all vegetation; the only
 
exception is a rural village of 
some half a dozen grass-roofed
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houses, still occupied by villagers, left standing amid hedges
 
and trees, but almost surrounded by the new brick city houses.
 
The community has distinct sections each in a different
 
stage of developmient. Where streets are laid out they follow 
a 
grid pattrn but there does not seem to be any unified street
 
pattern nor evidetitly provision for road rings or beltways. When 
I saw Kwang Ju in June 1971 1 noted particularly i.ts low profile 
of single-namily houses covering all available land in those sections 
already developed. In appearance and compactness these sections of 
Kwang Ju reminded me strongly of older residential areas of Seoul 
and Taegu. One 'ees church steeples but so far no buildings over 
3 stories. 
Development of Kwang Ju. 
Although the project itself is officially dated from 1968, the
 
actual developmental history of Kwang Ju covers only the last two
 
years and might be separated into the following phases:
 
First phase: Kwang Ju was originally designed as the settlement 
location of thousands of squatter families whose presence in Seoul
 
itself had by late 1968 or 1969 become an acute embarrassment to
 
the President of a nation priding itself on the pace and modernity
 
of its postwar development. Accordingly, inhabitants oZ entire
 
shantytown settlements in the capital were trucked out to Kwang Ju,
 
not so much pushed out as lured by the promise of low cost land on
 
which to settle. In Kwang Ju each family was allotted 20 pyong of
 
19
 
land (720 sq. feet). This land was not a gift from the government
 
but payments were to be spread over a 10-year period.
 
That sec-as to have been the extent of planning, and the 
consequece was a near catfastrophe. Most sett-lers had little or 
no money for building their houses on the land they now had, and 
the goverm-int offerud no subsidies for construction materials. 
There were as yet no industries in Kwang Ju and little work of 
any kind. Few provisions had been made for water or sewage 
services for the tens of thousands literally dumped into Kwang Ju. 
During the first winter (Seoul winters are severe) most families 
lived in tents or shacks and survived as best they could.
 
Eventually many families (estimates run to as high as 
80 percent of the original. settlers) sold their land to whomever
 
would buy it and with the money moved back to squatter settlements 
in Seoul. (this time doubling up with friends or relatives and 
compounding the congestion in the squatter settlements still
 
standing). Thus, as a means of solving the squatter problem in
 
Seoul Kwang Ju must be rated as a decided failure, and to this 
extent it has not lived up to the rather unrealistic hopes of its
 
sponsors.
 
Second phase: In April 1970 the present Mayor Yang of Seoul
 
was appointed (succeeding Mayor Kim--popularly known as Bulldozer
 
Kim--who was dismissed after some newly built municipal apartment
 
houses collapsed with considerable loss of life). Mayor Yang
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painted for me a grim picture of conditions in Kwang Ju at that
 
time. The several thousand families still. there were destitute 
and desperate. The congressman fromit that district pleaded for 
the central government to do something. When thee Nayor visited 
Kwang Ju he was nearly mobbed by angry settlers and he took to 
making his visits under covl-r of darknes. 
But improvements were made, some jimmediately and others part 
of a long-range plan at last developed. Water was supplied and 
roads improved. At the Mayor's insistence the government used 
manual labor rather than earlth-moving machinery for physical 
improvements, thus creating jobs for s4ttlers. ius service to 
Seoul was greatly augmented (within a year the number of daily 
busses rose from /. to 140). The Mayor declares that- now when he 
visits Kwang Ju he does so during the daytime and hears no complaints. 
The community is booming and he takes obvious pride in having turned 
Kwang Ju around. Understandably, the Mayor is sensitive to criticisms 
of the community by outsiders. 
The explanation for the apparent success of Kwang Ju lies not 
simply in physical improvements of the kind mentioned above. What
 
seems to have happened is that once the government at Mayor Yang's
 
insistence began to offer businesses and industries substantial tax
 
incentives to locate in Kwang Ju, land speculators became active,
 
buying up settlers' plots and also land along the main roads and in
 
the market plazas allocated to business use in the government's master
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plan. Presumably these speculators served to accelerate [he out­
migration of the original squatters also. The combination of land 
speculation and conimcrcial development seems to have generated a 
boom in a very short time. Middle class families in Seout, (defined 
broadly as white collar, entrepreneurial, and prolessional. See 
Lee: Urban Life in Korea) now began to buy land in Kwang Ju and to 
build houses there. This stimulated further migration from Seoul. 
Quite suddenly Kwang Ju became a good place to live for shopkeepers, 
artisans, would-be entrepreneurs, and professional families. According 
to some reports, even the squatters are returning now, some commuting
 
from squatter settlements in Seoul to daily construction jobs in
 
Kwang Ju. Also, there is now (June 1971) a burgeoning squatter 
settlement of several hundred shanties at one end of Kwaug Ju itself. 
One might wonder why the government has permitted land speculation
 
at Kwang Ju, but the reasons are not difficult to find. The City of
 
Seoul government originally bought up all land there. It sold land
 
plots to'the early squatter settler and later to commercial interests,
 
planning to receive payments over a ten-year period. But if such land
 
is resold by the original purchaser, then the new owner must pay up
 
at once the full amount due to the government. The ten-year payment
 
provision does not apply to subsequent purchasers. Thus, when land is
 
resold, the government can count on an immediate recovery of its initial
 
investment. Moreover, inasmuch as all land values have appreciated,
 
commercial land still held by the city has skyrocketed in value, and
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this when sold by the goverrmuent means a considerable profit on 
its original investment (said to be in the neighborhood of I billion 
won). For example, it was mentioned in talks with the Mayor that 
land bought by the City for 400 won per pyonL only 2 years ago can 
now be sold by the City for from 40,000 to 200,000 won depending on 
its location.
 
Some critics of Kwang Ju dismiss the project as simply a money 
making scheme on the part of the City government, which is precisely 
what it is intended to be. But the money is made not at the expense 
of the original settlers, but mainly commercial interests seeking to 
locate in Kwang Ju. In this sense the small businessman (and to a 
certain extent the middle class settler) have paid for Kwang Ju. 
Moreover, the money generated from land sales in Kwang Ju, according 
to Mayor Yang, will constitute a revolving fund to be used to finance 
the next satellite city planned for development within a year. 
Kwang Ju is still in the second phase of growth. Only about one­
third of the total area seems as yet settled. Land is still being
 
cleared and streets plotted in anticipation of continued growth. One
 
sees families moving in daily, their household goods piled high in
 
trucks. Elementary and high schools are built and operating. Some
 
electronic industries housed in modern factories are already in
 
production and scores of other industries are said to be about to
 
build in Kwang Ju. A clinic has already been opened, and some small
 
Korean style inns can accommodate travelers.
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Final phase: The City expects to complete all planned 
construction in Kwang Ju by the end of fiscal year 1972. 
Specifically, this ieans that the iresenC open drainage ditch will 
be converted into a mammoth sewer, with a four-lane entry road 
constructed over its top. Water and electricity will be sLIpplied
 
to all sections and all major roads within Kwang Ju will be paved. 
A new express highway will be opened within a matter of months, 
making it possi'ble to get into downtown Scoul in only 30 minutes. 
Bus service with Seoul will be further augnented. 
In addition to these physical improvements, Mayor Yang informed 
us that later this year (1971) some 2,000 squatter families
 
(presumably about 10,000 persons in all) now living in the East
 
Gate section of'Seoul will be moved to Kwang Ju. The official 
statistics on annual resettlement of squatters to the Kwang Ju
 
project is as follows:
 
Year 1969 1970 
 1971 1972 1973 Total
 
No. of
 
Households 3,500 11,500 20,000 15,000 5,650 
 55,650
 
Persons 20,000 55,000 100,000 75,000 
 28,000 278,000
 
I have no hard information as to whether these goals have been
 
achieved insofar as squatter resettlement is concerned. Few if any
 
qualified observers in Seoul, however, would believe that by the end
 
of this year (1971) as many as 175,000 squatters will have been
 
resettled in Kwang Ju; although by the end of this year the population
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of the community might well reach and even exceed that figure, The 
bulk of the residents in Kwang Ju are likely not to be squatters 
from Seoul. 
As noted, by the end of 1973 Kwang Ju anticipates a population 
of 3,500,000, but I would be surprised if it did not run up to
 
350,000 in a very short tisie. 
C. EVALUATION. 
When consid-ring Kwang Ju as an example of Korean town planning, 
some simple facts should be kept in mind which by themselves provide a 
pragmatic tesL of this project and of Korean town planning. A 
reasonably complete city housing at least 350,000 persons will be 
built from scratch in just 1iyears. I do not believe any modern 
nation can equal this astonishing accomplishment. Neither in Korean 
nor American terms is this to be a model city, but certain aspects of 
the plan might serve as a model for other developing nations. 
First, it seems to me that the City of Seoul has, quite by accident,
 
discovered what might well be a very feasible procedure for developing
 
such satellite cities. This formula as described above involves:
 
(1) government buys up land where the future city will be located and 
develops a basic town plan; (2) land plots for houses are sold at low 
cost to poor families and substantial tax incentives are offered 
commercial and industrial entrepreneurs to locate businesses there; 
(3) land speculation is encouraged and indeed poor settlers are enabled
 
to sell out if they wish and use the mone.y received as a cash stake for
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a better life; (4) as por-mancnt settlers and businesses arrive, the 
resulting construction boom generates jobs for lower income workers 
and additional entrepreneurial opportunities for small scale business­
men, which in turn stimulaLes increased migration from the nearby urban 
center; (5) the government profit realized from the sale of land at 
highly appreciated prices is used for subsequent communities, or for 
the improvement of existing ones.
 
This formula scents to have worked at Kwang Ju. It has a number 
of unknown aspects which might make it less than desirable even at 
Kwang Ju. Were there unwarranted profits made by the original land 
owner (said to be a corporation led by a former Army colonel). w-hen 
the government first bought up the tract? Has land speculation gotten 
out of hand now in Kwang Ju, so that the cost of land/housing may be 
too high for even middle income settlers? I do not have the answers 
to such questions. All I can say is that families are moving in 
daily and the city is obviously booming.
 
Whether the formula described above will work again in South
 
Korea remains to be seen, however. Another satellite city is now on
 
the planning table, but it will be almost impossible to keep secret
 
its location so as to avoid land speculation before the government
 
buys the land. Unless this premature speculation is avoided, the
 
government will lose the major economic advantage it had in Kwang Ju.
 
The Kwang Ju experience indicates that while rural and working
 
class families willingly migrate to established cities, they do not
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successfully migrate to new saLellite cities. Thus Lhe progression 
of permanent migrants to thse new communities seems to be first, 
I 
middle class fomilie-s, thei working clas: (including squatter) 
families. Kwang Ju has caught the midd'e. class overspill from Seoul 
and in doing this has eased pressure to some extent on middle class 
housing in the capital, but it has been at best a doubtful success
 
for squatter resettlement.
 
Kwang Ju demonstrates also that it is not so much new factory 
type industries that attract and hold migrants (possibly because 
these are only slowly constructed piecemeal) but the job and 
entrepreneurial opportunities generated by the community itself, as 
thousands move in and as houses, schools, reads, sewers and the like 
are built. Thus the Koreans seem again to have hit on a workable
 
formula for building these new coimunities: provide at the start
 
only the minimum facilities and plan to have physical improvements
 
made as the community grows, thus generating construction and other 
jobs that cart keep pace with the tide of incoming migrants. At the
 
moment Kwang Ju has little if any unemployment, yet only a very few
 
industries are actually in operation there.
 
Finally Kwang Ju demohstrates the utility of having a minimum of
 
planning and of zoning. The government need control only the basic
 
outline of the new community, specifically, locate streets, water and
 
sewage lines, market areas and industrial parks, but permit the
 
settlers as they arrive to fill in the ditails in terms of actual
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structures like houses, shops, offices, inns, churchca, and the
 
desired mix of all these. In Kwang Ju the result is a community that
 
seems compatible with basic cultural and social norms of the residents,
 
in short, a Korean city which seems to be the kind of city Koreans
 
want to live in.
 
Despite those hopeful aspects of the plan, 1 am conscious of 
several soft points in the conception of KWang Ju with possibly
 
undesirable future consequences. .called attention to the most
 
obvious ones in my final coiversation with the Mayor ahd Vice Mayor
 
on June 17, 1971. It seems apparent that completion of the express
 
highway between Kwang Ju and Seoul, making possible a trip to the
 
center of Seoul in only 30 minutes, will have two results. First,
 
it will encourage daily coi;nuting by wage earners so that increasingly
 
Kwang J will become simply a dormiL".ry appendage of Seoul. This in
 
turn will place quite a burden on transportation to, from, and within
 
the capital, something the present Seoul City Plan is designed
 
specifically to avoid. Secondly, the population of Kwang Ju is likely
 
to balloon well beyond the 350,000 estimate of planners, conceivably
 
to as many as half a million persons in a short time. Lacking any
 
feasible way to control such growth, logic should suggest that
 
authorities plan for it now in terms of housing, water, sewage, etc.
 
I am under the impression that facilities and services as currently
 
planned will be adequate for only some 350,000 persons. I might
 
briefly consider an assumption that appears to underlie the government's
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Seoul City Plan. That is, once the Plan is developed the pace of 
urbanization will, slacken considerably, or put differcatly, once 
a satellite city like Kwang Ju has reached its planned population, 
then it will stop expanding. Built into the population of all these 
cities is a very high population growth potential. Cities may not
 
grow as fast from in-migration, but they wi]l. continue to grow by 
the natural increase of persons already living there (see Davis, 
"The Urbanization of the Human Population"). Thus, rather than 
attempting measures to stem the tide of growth, Asian governments 
like that of South Korea might well accept the fact of a coming 
urbanized society for the nation and plan for this condition. It
 
may be unfair to assume this is not the case, but I cannot be-sure.
 
Some non-technical aspects of town planning in general and of 
Kwang Ju in particular may be much more difficult to treat simply 
because they are less obvious and therefore less likely to be 
defined as problems at all. In this connection it seems to me that 
some basic non-technical assumptions require re-examination. Let 
me suggest some questions that might be raised. 
One concerns the role and function of squatter settlements
 
themselves in large cities like Seoul. Research conducted by
 
Korean scholars at universities in Seoul indicates that these
 
shantytowns act as a "conditioning" milieu for rural migrants so
 
newcomers can become acculturated to the values, demands, and life
 
style of the city. As a consequence migrants are enabled to
 
participate more effectively in urban institutions and experience the
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least amount of disorganization and disruption. These settlements, 
outwardly squalid, give migrants a low-cost place to live initially 
while seeking employment, a chance to learn in urban skill (not the 
least being how to survive in that alien environment), contact with 
helpful kin and villagers already in the city knowledgeable about 
job and-other opportunities, the opportunity to become part of a 
cohesive, protective community, the chance to save money (thank to 
the very low cost of housing), and so on. In such shantytowns these 
migrants take the first step toward the steady improvement of their 
life chances. Some migrants progress from squtter settlements to 
better housing. Many squatter settlements if left alone become 
stabilized and improved by the residents and become what Korean 
researchers call "middle class" living areas. Something of the 
same thing is reported for a squatter settlemtnt in Kuala Lumpur 
(see McGee: 160-165) and even for Communist China (see Snow: 515-516). 
Seoul's squatter settlements have not been centers of vi.ce and social
 
disorganization, although residents may earn a living'at shady
 
occupations elsewhere in the city (as bar girls, for instance).
 
The squatter settlements seem well organized, albeit informally so;
 
they are protective of social cohesion, not destructive of the
 
traditional cement binding together the family and community. Seen
 
from this perspective it does not make sense to raze these shantytowns
 
indiscriminately and expose migrants to unbearable and highly
 
disorganizing pressures of urban life. The Seoul City Government
 
seems to have recognized this fact at times because a few squatter
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settlements have gained official permission to exist (at least 
for a time) but not to expand. In these communities houses are 
numbered and even mail is delivered regularly. Given all this, 
I would argue that at this stage of urbanization, South Korean 
cities actually need squatter settlements, and the government
 
could justifiably deliberately create them under controlled
 
conditions that would reduce so far as possible their most 
undesirable features. At this stage of urbanization the city has
 
nothing to take the place of the squatter settlement. 
The corollary of this is that satellite cities such as Kwang Ju
 
should be seen primarily as places for the resettlement of middle 
class urban .'.amilies, not squatters. As noted, such families seem 
actually to have filled up Kwang Ju. I might note that a study of 
a newly planned community called "Petaling Jaya" just outside of 
Malaysia's capital of 7uala Lumpur came to the conclusion that this 
new town also seemed to attract middl- and upper-level occupational 
groups raher than working class or squatter populacions. (See
 
McGee and McTaggart, page 22.). This being the case, planners need
 
to know much more about the middle clAss family and its intracity 
migration patterns. How much unfilled middle class demand is there
 
in Seoul for better housing? Who has moved into Kwang Ju, and for 
what reasons? How are moving decisions made in the middle class 
Korean family and what are the compelling incentives to move? Who 
has moved into the houses and apartments vacated by the present
 
settlers of Kwang Ju?
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Based on the experience of other Asian cities with squatter
 
problems (Hong Kong notably), we might hypothesize a patterned
 
progression of families from one type of housing to another.
 
Rural migrants coming to Seoul live initially in squatter 
settlements. Once established (and it would be useful to knrw 
how long this takes) and with soiac savings, these families suck 
better housing in established neighborhoods. As satellite cities 
attract middle class residents from Seoul., housing is made 
available to upwardly mobile squatters. Thus if a rough numerical 
balance is found.between incoming migrant families to Seoul and 
outgoing middle class families to the satellite city, then existing
 
squatter settlements (assuming no government action to raze the'm)
 
would remain stabilized in size and number. If so, the satellite
 
city would have little actual effect on squatter settlements. 
Such an hypothesis is thrown in here for two reasons: to
 
emphasize that we need more data on intracity migration if planning
 
is to achieve its stated goals; and to indicate that a very real
 
question can be raised about the stated goal of Kwang Ju, that is',
 
to eliminate any reason for squatter settlements in Seoul. Kwang Ju
 
has had many very useful consequences so far as Seoul is concerned
 
but in my opinion it has not in any significant way touched the
 
squatter problem.
 
So far I have called attention to but two :on-technical areas
 
deserving systematic study: (1) aspects of life in Seoul itself
 
that affect the success or failure of Kwang Ju, especially the function
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of squatter settlements; and (2) the nature of intra-city migration 
(Kwang Ju is administratively part of Seoul and increasingly seems 
destined to be linked physically with Lhe capital). 
Two other aspects of Kwang Ju dentand attention. One is the 
nature of "comlunity" that is developing in the new satellite city: 
the formal and informal social giou[ps that arise spontaieously and 
otherwise in response to the demands of urban life, such as 
voluntary associations of neighbors, merchats, workers, co-religionists; 
the mutual aid concepts and arrangeic,1-,ms at different sta-,es of growth; 
the informal social control institutions and mechanisms and their 
effectiveness--all this in comparison with patterns found in the old 
neighborhood of Seoul. Inasmuch as Kwang Ju has a decidedly frontier 
ambience, I would expect a reinterpretation at least of traditional 
grouping and social control patterns with conscquences for connunity 
stability and cohesion and the incipient development of personal and
 
social disorganization as evidenced by family dissolution, juvenile
 
delinquency, and crime generally.
 
In connection with this the role of industries being established
 
in Kwang Ju needs to be understood. For the most part these are
 
so-called clean industries. But such industries are likely to employ
 
women rather than men (those already operating seem to be doing this
 
now). If so, then male wage earners must seek employment elsewhere,
 
or may go unemployed, with obvious consequences for accepted role
 
patterns within the family. Already there are reports of restless
 
and unsupervised juveniles in Kwang Ju, petty crime, and the like
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which, if true, could be the outward manifestation of basic changes 
in institutional life.
 
The second additional area deserving study concerns the effect
 
of Kwang J, on rural lif6:' - The Kwang Ju project took over land
 
formerly occupied by one or two villages; these were (or are about
 
to be) eliminated entirely. It seems destined to affect life in other 
villages nearby also. The sudden creation of a city of 350,000 persons 
is bound to be seriously disruptive of formerly isolated grass-roofed
 
villages, but this aspect of the Kwang Ju 
project has not as yet 
caught the attention of planners. Among the more disturbing prospects 
is that by its very presence in the midst of a rural area Kwang Ju will 
serve to stimulate enormously rural-urban migration. Such migration 
lies at the core of South Korea's urbani/ation difficulties, but 
unfortunately at times government measures have inadvertently 
contributed to the problem. New roacb such as the one about to be 
opened between Kwang Ju and Seoul do 
serve to funnel rural migrants
 
into the city, whatever their other functions. And Kwang Ju,
 
although it is designed to relieve population pressure on Seoul,
 
may intensify the capital's urbanization problem by subtly encouraging
 
rural migration. Already Kwang Ju itself has several thousand
 
squatters,"presumably recent migrants from nearby rural villages.
 
Here then are four conditions badly in need of systematic
 
research. The results of such studies could be cranked into plans
 
for Kwang Ju and other satellite cities. What are the prospects for
 
such research? At the moment, not at 
all good. For one thing, only
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the government has the resources and the authority to initiate 
and sustain the comprehensive research projects needed here. 
Individual schelars and research centers at the several Seoul 
universities have neither the time nor the money to do more than 
piecemeal studies. They are even more limited than their American 
counterparts. Occasio'ally the Seoul City Govermient has of[ered 
to sponsor research Eut not often and not consistently, and not at
 
all if the research seems likely to be critical of any existing
 
program. The government's role is crucial for the success of any 
project. In my short stay in South Korea I came across several
 
instances of this. One professor studying rural villages in the
 
Kwang Ju vicinity needed aerial photos. Only the governiment can 
authorize such mapping, and he was unable to secure that authorization. 
Another academic researe.1hain Kwang Ju found himself and his assistaut 
being closely followed and in fact at times accompanied by CIA agents,
 
a-condition which seriously inhibited any Korean they tried to
 
interview. As noted, a foreign sociologist who studied reactions
 
of early settlers in Kwang Ju had his report when submitted suppressed
 
by the government. On the other hart whe'n the government backs a
 
research study, then official data are readily furnished and officials
 
at all levels willingly cooperate.
 
But the government's attitude is only part of the problem. Another
 
part is the pervasive sense of competition among the various scholars,
 
departments, and research centers at the different universities.
 
Professors within any university--fenerally work well together, but
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individual acadcLicians complainecd to me about a lack of full 
cooperation from colleagues at their university, presumably because 
the value of competition outweighs cooperation at this stage. 
Cross-universit[y research is virtually none.istent (how much is there 
of this among Aimerican universities?). I found professors and 
directors of research centers eager to discuss theiir own projects
 
(perhaps because they defined me as a source of funding) but lacking
 
knowledge of, and apparently interest in, work being done by scholars
 
at other Seoul universities. Research data tend to be treated the way 
business might treat trade secrets: something to be kept from 
competitors. Korean scholars communicate at international conferences,
 
but less so within their own country. Consequently, there has been a
 
plethora of social science "research institutions" established in the 
Seoul area. Every major university has one, each competing for funds
 
from the government and outside foundations. I found in Seoul that
 
USIA and AID had a more comprehensive grasp of research in Korea than
 
did individual universities and research centers. 
This is so because 
these agencies have been a major souce of funding for research. The 
Americans at these agencies seeking to encourage development have 
become centers of communication and information about what is happening
 
at the different universities. Men like Mr. Dallas Hunter and Dr. Carl
 
Bartz,although not academicians themselves, have served to coordinate
 
scholarly talent and resources but inadvertently they seem also to
 
have contributed to the proliferation of research centers.
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Needed, therefore, if town plaaning is to realize its potential 
in South Korea is a resolution of thi.s problem. Kwang Ju offers a 
marvelous real-life and on-going laboratory for research of ,ll kinds, 
and the govornmient might he enCOuraged to set up a central data 
collecting office there to be put in charge of oie of the more
 
promising existing university research institutes. It might be
 
feasible to do 
 this with each of tht, satellite cities as they are
 
established, so that each of the 
 major universities would be involved 
at a different site, thus utilizing the basic value of competition
 
now so evident. I seriously doubt, however, that the South 
 Korean
 
government is ready for unfer.tered social science research at thiF
 
time in its history. 
PART TV: Concl1,din Thoughts: Land Use and City Planrinc' 
Despite my familiarity with Asian cities, in Korea I was 
once
 
more forcibly irmpressed by the striking coatrasts between American
 
cities and those of Asia, especially, of course, Seoul itself.
 
Cities in both areas 
arc expanding rapidly, but differently.
 
American cities for the past 
two decades have been exploding into
 
suburbs. Asian cities are experiencing an implosion of population.
 
While the white American urbanite flees the central city for the
 
suburbs, Asians in a rising tide migrate from rural areas to 
the
 
large cities of their countries.
 
Thus American cities are commonly marked by sprawling
 
37
 
"developments" and "shopping centers" and above all. by "ticky-tacky" 
single-family houses on the outskirts, and downtown by urban decay. 
Asian cities are distinguished by high.rise "rrescttlcment blocks" 
(as in Hong Kong, with one room per family) and modern high-rise 
apartment housing as in Seoul. American cities spread out; Asian 
cities build up and tuck ever more fm~iilies into the city. Seoul 
for example now houses 6 million where 3 million lived only a decade 
ago, and many believe the same area will soon have to house as many 
as 10 million or more. 
American cities are faced by a complex of social problems
 
defying any quick solution, or any solution at all: integration
 
and segregation; minority rights; family disorganization; juvenile
 
delinquency and crime; political mismanagement and corruption.
 
South Korean cities have problems that are technical in nature: 
water supply, sewage disposal, traffic congestion, inadequate 
housing, all susceptible to relatively easy solution (when compared 
to the social problems of American cities) by the application of money
 
and technology.
 
While American cities seem to repel their residents, Asian
 
cities lure people in. By all accounts, American cities are dy.Lg;
 
as the New York Times of July 19, 1971 noted, the weather-beaten
 
boarded-up store front is replacing the gleaming steel and glass
 
skyscraper as a symbol of the American city. Asian cities, and Seoul
 
in particular, are living, dynamic, eternally stimulating, and despite
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unsafe water and pollut:ed air a joy to live in. 
No single factor will account for these differences but a good 
part of the explanation lies in the land use pattern accepted as 
desirable in American cities as contrastLed with Lhose. of Asian cities 
like Seoul. Or put more bluntly, if anything has killed the American 
city it is the overuse of zoning and of planning.
 
The Asian city (excluding, of course, coloni'il cities like Saigon 
and Singapore built by European powers) is characcerizoCi by a low 
incidence of functional differentiation in land use patterns. This is 
a feature also of the preindustrial city (see Sojerg, 95-103) from 
which the modern Asian cities l.ke Seoul have sprung. Tn these cities 
one plot of land may be used for more than one function, also the
 
typical neighborhood shows multiple uses of the land. 1he shophouse
 
is a typical feature of the Asian city; generally a row-house structure,
 
the shophouse combines a small family-run shop or business or even
 
industry on the ground floor and living quarters for the proprietor's
 
family on the second and third floors. Neighborhoods thus show a mixed
 
business, small industry, and residential use. In the same neighborhood,
 
moreover, one will find single-family houses, rented rooms and apartments,
 
small restaurants, perhaps a modern hotel or Asian-style inn, a school,
 
In such neighborhoods
church, or temple, and an open-air curbside market. 

some structures will be quite new and very modern, but others will have a
 
dilapidated, even run-down look. There seems to be a place for everyone
 
and anything, within reason, of course, in these Asian city neighborhoods.
 
Because of the mixture of functions and the varied timetables
 
followed by residents, the Asian neighborhood is never devoid of people,
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but strangers mix with rcs:idents and maintain a delicate boundary 
betwcen public and priva( ajffairs; the round-the-clock surveillance 
all this makc, pos-;iblc assur.s safety in the streets and in the 
stores and buib ings. 
A telling contrast is provided by almost every American city, 
especially afs these ci ti.es lj2come zoned, or planncd, or redesigned 
by so-called urban renewal and slum clearance projects. Jane Jacobs 
prce nts, the case against current planning assumptions in her book 
encitlcd The Pteaih and T.i F of Great Airican Cities, an eloquent 
discussion of cxrrent Americran urban problems and proposals for 
solving them. Jacobs argues for the superiority of sidewalks over 
playgrounds for children's play, the need for small blocks delimited 
by numerous small streets and lanes, the advisability of discouraging 
the flow of private: automobiles to and from the city center and at 
the same time a renewed attention to pedustrian desires, the advantages 
of mixed residential and coimiercial occupancy, and the value of 
dilapidated buildings that provide niches for marginal enterprises.
 
She is opposed to massive slum clearance because the operation
 
inevitably destroys the social fabric of an existing neighborhood.
 
The creation of huge apartment houses whose residents are surrounded
 
by unusable open spaces but deprived of the small daily interchanges
 
she sees as a form of blight more serious than the structural
 
deterioration of slum dwellings.
 
Such criticisms of American planning are very relevant to a
 
discussion of urban problems in South Korea. Although South Korean
 
planners used imaginative and successful procedures in developing the
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these Wostern-trained specialists and
satellite city of Kwang Ju, 

as
 
officials appear sold ultimately on the American model of 
the city 

their nation's modernity. The Seoul City Plan
 a validation of 

increase in private automobiles
An enormous
reflects this modcl. 
are elevated highways and arLerial road: cuttingis accepted. So 

to 
 high a percentage of
 through the city. Seoul plans devote as 
its land area to roads; as does New York City--and put as many 
The City has already constructed impressivepeople in apartMents. 

The

complexes of high-rise apartment houses and more are planned. 

Central Business District of Seoul when rebuiil.t will resemble the
 
gone will be the present very
commercial heart of Manhattan, but 

vibrant hyongdong District of small shops, narrow lanes, and a
 
The Central
fascinating mix of nondescript and modern buildings. 

Business District will likely be the first section of Seoul to die.
 
Americans are having second thoughts about modernity and progress
 
that denudes the environment and dehumanizes the city, but Koreans
 
do not seem to know this. High officials in New York City talk
 
seriously about keeping private automobiles out and turning streets
 
and parks back to pedestrians, but Seoul city planners are going the
 
Critics like Jacobs declare that standard American
other way. 

planning and zoning are killing our cities and they call for a
 
change if this environmental sickness is to be reversed, but little
 
of this seems to have reached Korean officials.
 
It is ironic that some Korean officials objected to my proposed
 
study of urbanization problems in Seoul because they feared I would
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apply unfairly Western concopts of city life to 
this Asian setting.
 
The very real danger that 
I see is that these esteri-t'ained 
same denuding and dehumanizing
 
and 
Western-oriented qpociali ts will Llemseives apply those Wu:steViH 
assumptions to th..ir citics, with the 
results that we 
see in the large American city. 
 So far Kwang J.hhas
 
been spared, but 
the visual,representation of 
t Le ftuture Kwang Ju and 
of Seoul makes iL abundantly clear that the goal is the application
 
of outmoded American land 
use 
and zoning standards. 
I might relate an incident that occurred when 1. visited the 
Kwang Ju 
area with a mixed group of Korean and American planninS!
 
specialists. 
One Korean in 
the group, with advanced degrees in
 
architecture and city planning from a major Western university,
 
was bitterly critical of Kwang Ju because this so-called planned 
community lacks.playgrounds and parks, has narrow lanes much like 
Seoul itself, along with small plots of land for each house which
 
results in high density of population. But 
in the group was an
 
American student of urban planning who argued that whatever else
 
one might say about Kwang Ju, it 
seemed to 
be a place Koreans
 
wanted to 
live, and that if it resembled older parts of Seoul in
 
its housing and narrow lanes and lack of centralized play areas,
 
this might well be the way Koreans want to use 
their land. It
 
seemed to me 
that the Korean specialist was applying a Western
 
yardstick to Kwang Ju, and the community did not measure up. 
 The
 
American used a Korean standard, which I believe is much more
 
appropriate.
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Korean citi:s are now alivo and well. 
 If South Koreans can
 
avoid the slavish application of Westoin standards, these cities
 
will remain vital. The greatest feature of Kwang Ju 
is that it
 
is a Korean community, and if permitted to 
remain so iL will be
 
healthy for 
a very long time--perhaps forever. 
American planners
 
and city officials have 
a good deal to learn from Korean cities,
 
but oddly enough it is Koreans themselves who must be first
 
convinced of this 
if Korea is to 
avoid the blight that has struck
 
American cities in this century.
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